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Yearning for Zion Ranch Raid
LOWERING THE STANDARD OF PROOF FOR THE
TERMINATION OF PARENTAL RIGHTS
INTRODUCTION
In April 2008, over 400 children were seized from the
Yearning for Zion Ranch in Eldorado, Texas by Child
Protective Services on the grounds that the children were
suffering from abuse.1 An anonymous complaint made by a
sixteen-year-old girl alleging physical and sexual abuse
prompted the raid.2 The residents of the Ranch were members
of the Fundamentalist Church of Jesus Christ of Latter-Day
Saints (“FLDS”), a breakaway sect of the mainstream Mormon
community.3 The state sought to remove the children from their
parents’ custody on the premise that the sect’s belief in
polygamy and underage marriage created an imminent danger
to the children’s physical health and safety.4
This incident escalated the conflict between parental
rights and religious rights.5 Currently, the state’s burden of
proof to remove children from parental custody is the “clear
and convincing” standard as outlined in the landmark Supreme

1

Hari Sreenivasan, Finding the Truth in Eldorado: Is the FLDS Raid About
Stopping Child Abuse, or Is Freedom of Religion Being Abused?, CBS NEWS, Apr. 20,
2008, http://www.cbsnews.com/stories/2008/04/20/sunday/main4029277.shtml.
2
Ralph Blumenthal, Additional Children Removed At Polygamist Ranch in
Texas, N.Y. TIMES, Apr. 6, 2008, at A27.
3
The Fundamentalist Church of Jesus Christ of Latter-Day Saints (“FLDS”)
is a splinter sect of the Church of Jesus Christ of Latter Day Saints, the mainstream
Mormon religion. Mormonism began in 1830 as a religion that believed in polygamy
but such belief was abandoned by the Church of Mormon in 1890. Since then many
splinter groups have been created such as FLDS. These splinter groups, including
FLDS, continue to preach the validity of polygamy despite its illegal nature.
Additionally, as with most fundamental religions, FLDS and other splinter groups
maintain a rigorous lifestyle devoted to the doctrine of their religion. See D. Michael
Quinn, Plural Marriage and Mormon Fundamentalism, in FUNDAMENTALISMS AND
SOCIETY 240, 252 (Martin E. Marty & Scott Appleby eds., 1993).
4
In re Steed, No. 03-08-00235-CV, 2008 WL 2132014, at *1 (Tex. App. May
22, 2008), aff’d sub nom. In re Tex. Dep’t of Family and Protective Servs., 255 S.W.3d
613 (Tex. 2008).
5
See Sreenivasan, supra note 1.
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Court case, Santosky v. Kramer.6 This heightened standard
requires the evidence to be more persuasive than the common
civil standard of a preponderance of the evidence, i.e., more
likely than not.7 Consequently, states like Texas have statutes
that require proof of imminent danger to a child’s physical
health or safety for even temporary removal of children from
the custody of their parents.8 However, following the Yearning
for Zion Ranch raid, the question remains whether the nature
of these religious beliefs creates the type of imminent danger to
physical health and safety required by statute.9
Affirming the Court of Appeals of Texas, the Texas
Supreme Court held that there was no evidence that the
physical health or safety of the children from the Yearning for
Zion Ranch were in danger.10 Nor did the court find that the
FLDS belief system constituted sufficient evidence of imminent
abuse to warrant removal of the children from their parents.11
Furthermore, although it noted that the case involved
“important fundamental issues concerning parental rights and
the State’s interest in protecting children,” it declined to
further elaborate on these issues.12
6

Santosky v. Kramer, 455 U.S. 745, 768-69 (1982).
See infra notes 45-57 and accompanying text.
8
TEX. FAM. CODE ANN. § 262.201 (Vernon 2008). The relevant Texas statute
regarding removal pending a final termination hearing states in part:
7

(b) At the conclusion of the full adversary hearing, the court shall order the
return of the child to the parent . . . or custodian entitled to possession unless
the court finds sufficient evidence to satisfy a person of ordinary prudence
and caution that: (1) there was a danger to the physical health or safety of
the child which was caused by an act or failure to act of the person entitled to
possession and for the child to remain in the home is contrary to the welfare
of the child;
....
(d) In determining whether there is a continuing danger to the physical
health or safety of the child, the court may consider whether the household to
which the child would be returned includes a person who: (1) has abused or
neglected another child in a manner that caused serious injury to or the
death of the other child; or (2) has sexually abused another child.
Id.; see also In re Steed, No. 03-08-00235-CV, 2008 WL 2132014, at *1 (Tex. App. May
22, 2008), aff’d sub nom. In re Tex. Dep’t of Family and Protective Servs., 255 S.W.3d
613 (Tex. 2008).
9
See In re Steed, 2008 WL 2132014, at *1-3; Sreenivasan, supra note 1.
10
In re Tex. Dep’t of Family & Protective Servs., 255 S.W.3d. 613, 615 (Tex.
2008).
11
See id. Although the Court affirmed the ruling, it did so on the condition
that appropriate relief still be granted to protect the children, although the court did
not specify what type of relief would be appropriate. Id.
12
Id. (O’Neill, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part).
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The state intervention at the Yearning for Zion Ranch is
not the first raid on a Mormon fundamentalist community. In
1953, over 120 Arizona officers arrested thirty-six men and
eighty-six women, and took into custody 263 children from a
fundamentalist community in Short Creek, Arizona.13 The
purpose of the raid14 was to protect the children from “‘the foulest
conspiracy [one] could imagine . . . dedicated to the production of
white slaves.’”15 However, similar to the Yearning for Zion Ranch
case, the Supreme Court of Arizona ordered that the children be
returned home to their families.16 The Arizona court held that
the parents of the children seized in the Short Creek raid had
been denied participation by their attorneys during the custody
hearing, thereby resulting in a violation of the due process of law
and rendering a decision to deprive the parents of custody of
their children invalid.17 Furthermore, the Arizona court found
that neither party had presented evidence as to whether the
children’s safety and welfare would best be protected by
depriving the parents the right to custody.18 As a result, the
presumption that the child’s interests are best served by
allowing custody to remain with the child’s parents was not
rebutted, and therefore, it was in the interest of the children of
Short Creek to remain with their parents.19
Given the history of clashes between the state and
Mormon fundamentalists, the Yearning for Zion Ranch case
revived important issues dealing with a parent’s fundamental
rights in conflict with the interests of the State. This Note
argues that a parent’s religious beliefs can be evidence of
physical abuse and thus a danger to a child’s safety, prompting
the need for removal. Part I discusses a parent’s rights to the
upbringing of his or her child under the Fourteenth
Amendment, as well as the current burden of proof required to
terminate these parental rights under the Fourteenth
Amendment. Part I also examines a parent’s right to control
the religious upbringing of his or her child and contends that
these rights are not absolute and can be a factor in a custody
13

Michael Homer, Children in New Religious Movements: The Mormon
Experience, in INTRODUCTION TO NEW AND ALTERNATIVE RELIGIONS IN AMERICA 224,
234 (Eugene V. Gallagher & W. Michael Ashcroft eds., 2006).
14
As advocated by then-Governor of Arizona, J. Howard Pyle. Id.
15
Id.
16
Id.
17
Ariz. State Dep’t of Pub. Welfare v. Barlow, 296. P.2d 298, 299-300 (Ariz. 1956).
18
Id. at 301.
19
Id.
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determination. Next, Part II argues that religious beliefs
normally protected under the First Amendment can be
considered as evidence in parental termination cases and
suggests that termination is appropriate where these religious
beliefs are abusive. Furthermore, Part II contends that because
the Yearning for Zion Ranch community resembles one large
family and, in general, the presence of abuse in one child is
sufficient for the removal of the other children in the family,
the remainder of the Yearning for Zion Ranch children should
also be removed. Part III examines the policy arguments in
support of lowering the evidentiary standard. Part III asserts
that the current evidentiary standard leaves the child’s
interest to remain free from abuse not as protected as the
parent’s interest in custody of his or her child. Therefore,
further protection is warranted and can be achieved by
lowering the standard of proof. Finally, Part IV concludes that
when religion is considered abusive and pervasive throughout a
close community, like the Yearning for Zion Ranch, then the
standard of proof to remove the children from their parents in
the community should be lowered from the clear and
convincing standard to the preponderance of the evidence
standard.
I.

BACKGROUND

The current burden of proof for termination of parental
rights should be lowered to a preponderance of the evidence
standard in cases where a pervasive religious belief system
throughout a community promotes abuse in at least some of the
children within that community. In order to understand the
rationale behind this argument, it is first necessary to
understand the current law in regards to parental rights
termination, as well as the role of religion in child custody cases.
A.

Termination of Child Custody Rights
1. The Fourteenth Amendment Due Process Rights in
Child Custody Proceedings

The Fourteenth Amendment of the United States
Constitution requires that no state “deprive any person of life,
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liberty, or property, without due process of law.”20 Pursuant to
the Fourteenth Amendment, parents inherently have a
fundamental right to the care and custody of their children
unencumbered by the state.21 The right to marry, procreate,
and raise one’s children is considered “one of the basic civil
rights of man.”22 The Supreme Court first recognized the right
of parents to rear their children in Meyer v. Nebraska,23 holding
that the Fourteenth Amendment’s protection of life, liberty,
and property also included the protection of the individual’s
right to raise children.24 Specifically, the State could not
interfere with a parent’s choice to teach her children a foreign
language because this would be an undue interference with the
parent’s right to raise her children.25 Similarly, in Prince v.
Massachusetts, the Court recognized that a parent has the
authority to raise his or her child as part of “the private realm
of family life which the state cannot enter.”26 However, the
Court recognized that this private right could not conflict with
the state’s interest to protect the welfare of children.27 The
court stated that the rights of parenthood are not beyond
limitation and that the state may proscribe or compel certain
activity that is in the best interest of the child’s welfare.28

20

U.S. CONST. amend. XIV, § 1. The purpose of this provision is to provide
individuals with substantive and procedural protections when individual’s
fundamental rights are at risk of being compromised or terminated. See Ann E. Ward,
Standards of Proof in Parental Rights Termination: Santosky v. Kramer, 36 SW. L.J.
1069, 1070 (1982); see also ERWIN CHEMERINSKY, CONSTITUTIONAL LAW: PRINCIPLES
AND POLICIES 523 (2d ed. 2002). Procedural due process refers to the procedures the
government must undertake when seeking to deprive a person of their life, liberty, or
property. Id. This process usually means that an individual is entitled to notice and a
hearing before these rights are terminated. Id. Substantive due process refers to the
reasoning behind the deprivation of an individual’s life, liberty, or property. Id. The
level of substantive due process afforded depends upon the inherent nature of the
fundamental right at stake. Id. at 524. Generally, for an interest that is deemed
important to the individual, the government needs to show a compelling reason to
deprive the individual of this interest. Id. Parental custody rights are interests that are
deemed to be fundamental and, thus, required to be afforded both procedural and
substantive due process. Id.
21
Prince v. Massachusetts, 321 U.S. 158, 166 (1944).
22
Skinner v. State of Okl. ex rel. Williamson, 316 U.S. 535, 541 (1942); see
also Meyer v. Nebraska, 262 U.S. 390, 399 (1923).
23
262 U.S. 390 (1923).
24
Id. at 399.
25
See generally Meyer, 262 U.S. 390.
26
Prince, 321 U.S. at 165-66.
27
Id. at 165.
28
Id. at 166-68 (holding that the state may limit a parent’s insistence that a
child hand out religious literature as part of child employment laws).
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Given that parents have a fundamental right under the
Fourteenth Amendment to the care and custody of their
children, due process protections are necessary when the state
seeks to limit or terminate this fundamental right.29 As such,
the government may only terminate custody if the parents are
afforded some minimal level of procedural protection through
which they can argue their case.30 Furthermore, terminating
the parent’s custody must be necessary to achieve the State’s
compelling interest.31
To determine whether due process was met, the
following three factors, originally articulated in Matthews v.
Eldridge, must be considered: 1) the private interest affected
by government action; 2) the government’s countervailing
interest including “fiscal and administrative burdens;” and 3)
the risk of an erroneous decision.32 In a parental custody case,
the private interest affected is the parent’s right to care for and
have custody of his or her children.33 Additionally, unique to
custody cases, the child has a private interest at stake,
specifically the interest to be “free from abuse or neglect.”34
However, the child’s interest is not given the same weight as
the parent’s interest.35 The government’s interest is the health,
safety, and welfare of the children involved.36 In this respect,
the government’s interest is presumably aligned with the
parent’s interest in that the state and the parents are generally
concerned with preserving a child’s well-being, and this is
usually best achieved when a child is cared for by his or her
parents.37 However, the government’s interest will diverge from
that of the parents when the government has decided that

29

See Ward, supra note 20, at 1070-71.
CHEMERINSKY, supra note 20, at 772. Although procedures will vary from
state to state, courts will determine the sufficiency of the procedural protection by
analyzing the process using the Eldridge factors. See infra note 32 and accompanying
text.
31
Id.
32
Matthews v. Eldridge, 424 U.S. 319, 335 (1976).
33
Parents have an interest in “the companionship, care, custody and
management of his or her children” that “undeniably warrants deference and, absent a
powerful countervailing interest, protection.” Lassiter v. Dep’t of Soc. Servs. of Durham
County, N.C., 452 U.S. 18, 27 (1981) (internal quotation marks omitted) (quoting
Stanley v. Illinois, 405 U.S. 645, 651 (1972)).
34
Ward, supra note 20, at 1070.
35
Id. at 1072.
36
Lassiter, 452 U.S. at 27.
37
See id.
30
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remaining in the care and custody of the parent is no longer in
the best interest of the child.38
Additionally, the government must be concerned with
the fiscal and administrative costs of conducting a hearing to
determine the custody rights of parents.39 An increase in the
number of hearings required to comport with due process
standards undoubtedly increases the cost to the public.40
However, conserving administrative resources and lowering
costs are not controlling factors in determining whether
procedural safeguards are met.41 In parental custody cases, the
child’s welfare will outweigh these fiscal and administrative
factors.42 Finally, the court must consider the possibility of an
erroneous decision leading to a wrongful termination of the
parent’s custodial rights, which would not be in the best
interest of the parent, child, or the government. Thus, given
the importance of the interests at stake, the Supreme Court
has concluded that a hearing is necessary in order to decide
whether or not termination of parental rights is appropriate.43
2. Santosky v. Kramer: The Clear and Convincing
Standard
In conducting a hearing, an individual’s due process
rights are protected by the standard of proof required to
establish that the individual is no longer entitled to his or her
liberty or property rights.44 There are three evidentiary
standards: beyond a reasonable doubt, clear and convincing,
and preponderance of the evidence.45 The beyond a reasonable
doubt standard, the highest level of proof, is applied to criminal
cases in which an individual risks losing his freedom.46 The
burden is on the prosecutor to convince a jury of a “subjective
state of near certitude” that the defendant is guilty.47 This
38

See id.; Ward, supra note 20, at 1071-72.
See Matthews v. Eldridge, 424 U.S. 319, 347 (1976).
40
Id.
41
Id. at 348.
42
Stanley v. Illinois, 405 U.S. 645, 656-58 (1972).
43
Id.
44
See Santosky v. Kramer, 455 U.S. 745, 755-56 (1982); Spence v. Gormley,
439 N.E.2d 741, 750 (Mass. 1982).
45
Ward, supra note 20, at 1075.
46
Id.
47
Jackson v. Virginia, 443 U.S. 307, 331 (1979) (Stevens, J., concurring)
(internal quotations omitted) (quoting Norman Dorsen & Daniel A. Rezneck, In re
Gault and the Future of Juvenile Law, FAMILY LAW QUARTERLY 1, 26 (Dec. 1967)).
39
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standard is applied because of the importance of the personal
interest at stake and also the grave consequences of an
erroneous decision (namely, an individual’s loss of freedom).48
A preponderance of the evidence is the lowest standard
and is applied in most civil cases where only monetary loss is
at stake.49 By this standard, the weight of the evidence tends to
support the facts of one party more so than the other party.50
The clear and convincing standard of proof falls in between
reasonable doubt and preponderance of evidence.51 This
standard is applied when there is something at stake more
important than just a pecuniary interest, but not as protected
as an individual’s liberty.52 The clear and convincing standard
is most often applicable when an individual’s fundamental
rights are at stake.53 Generally, proof by clear and convincing
evidence is defined as the persuasion of the trier of fact that
“the facts asserted are highly probably true”54 and the trier of
fact has a “clear conviction, without hesitance, of the truth of
the facts related.”55 Specifically, the trier of fact must be
persuaded by more than a “substantial margin”56 and with a
“higher probability than is required by the preponderance-ofthe-evidence standard.”57
Prior to the decision in Santosky v. Kramer, states
varied as to the standard of proof required for termination of
parental custody. In Santosky v. Kramer, the Court struck
down a New York statute as unconstitutional on the grounds
that it offended the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth
48

Ward, supra note 20, at 1075.
Id.
50
Annotation, Instructions Defining Term “Preponderance or Weight of the
Evidence,” 93 A.L.R. 155 (1934).
51
Ward, supra note 20, at 1075.
52
Id.
53
In re Polk License Revocation, 449 A.2.2d 7, 13 (N.J. 1982). For example, in
a civil commitment proceeding, the clear and convincing standard of proof is required
since this type of proceeding involves the fundamental right of freedom from restraint.
Foucha v. Louisiana, 504 U.S. 71, 84, 86 (1992). The clear and convincing standard
may also be used in cases in which it is determined that a patient would wish to end
life sustaining medical support. See Cruzan v. Dir., Mo. Dep’t of Health, 497 U.S. 261,
285 (1990). Denaturalization and deportation proceedings also require a clear and
convincing standard of proof. See Woodby v. INS, 385 U.S. 276, 277 (1966)
(deportation); Chaunt v. U.S., 364 U.S. 350, 353 (1960) (denaturalization).
54
Lopinto v. Haines, 441 A.2d 151, 156 (Conn. 1981).
55
First Nat’l Bank of Roland v. Rush, 785 S.W.2d 474, 479 (Ark. Ct. App. 1990).
56
United Mine Workers v. Gibbs, 383 U.S. 715, 736 (1966).
57
California ex rel. Cooper v. Mitchell Bros.’ Santa Ana Theater, 454 U.S. 90,
93 n.6 (1981).
49
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Amendment because it allowed for termination of custody
rights upon a showing by a preponderance of the evidence that
the parent was unfit and the child was permanently
neglected.58 The Court concluded that in order to terminate
parental custody rights, the State must prove by clear and
convincing evidence that the parents are no longer entitled to
custody of their children.59 Thus, to terminate a parent’s
custody rights,60 the trier of fact must have a “clear conviction,
without hesitance, of the truth of the facts related”61 and believe
that “the facts asserted are highly probably true.”62 In support
of its decision, the Court applied the Eldridge factors in ruling
out the preponderance standard in favor of the clear and
convincing standard.63 First, the Court found that the private
interests at stake were compelling.64 Second, the Court found
that the risk of error in using the preponderance of the
evidence standard was high because the parents would suffer
an irrevocable grievous loss.65 Third, the Court concluded that
any countervailing governmental interest in using a
preponderance standard was minimal when compared to the
first and second factors.66
Since Santosky, all parental termination proceedings
require the clear and convincing standard.67 The Court affirmed
that, going forward, a case by case analysis for the evidentiary
standard in termination proceedings was inappropriate and
due process rules are applied to “the generality of the cases, not
the rare exception.”68 It is crucial that the parties and the fact58

Santosky v. Kramer, 455 U.S. 745, 747 (1982).
Id. at 747-48.
60
A parent’s custody rights are generally terminated when there is evidence
of abuse or neglect to the child. See generally SCOTT E. FRIEDMAN, THE LAW OF PARENTCHILD RELATIONSHIPS: A HANDBOOK 133-44 (1992).
61
First Nat’l Bank of Roland v. Rush, 785 S.W.2d 474, 479 (Ark. Ct. App. 1990).
62
Lopinto v. Haines, 441 A.2d 151, 156 (Conn. 1981).
63
See Santosky, 455 U.S. at 758, 769.
64
Id. at 758. The Court considered the private interests of the parents to the
care and custody of their children to be “far more precious than any property right.” Id.
at 758-59. Further, to terminate a parent’s right to custody of his or her child would not
mean merely an infringement upon the parent’s constitutional fundamental rights but
an obliteration of this right all together. See id. at 759. Thus, the court found the
private interest of the parents to be so compelling that a higher degree of certainty as
to the parent’s unfitness is necessary to terminate custody rights. See id. at 759, 769.
65
Id. at 758-59.
66
Id. at 758.
67
Id. at 769.
68
Id. at 757 (internal quotation marks omitted) (quoting Matthews v.
Eldridge, 424 U.S. 319, 344 (1976)).
59
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finder are aware of “how the risk of error will be allocated,
[thus] the standard of proof necessarily must be calibrated in
advance.”69 Accordingly, state courts have unmistakably
adopted the clear and convincing standard for child
termination proceedings.70 Texas is no exception: the Texas
Appellate Court has consistently held that the termination of
parental rights requires clear and convincing evidence.71
The effect of the use of this heightened standard in
termination proceedings can be seen in other child protection
laws. For instance, in Texas, emergency removal of children
from the home is allowed only if there is an immediate danger
to the health or safety of the child caused by the act or omission
of a person entitled to custodial possession of the child, and
protection requires immediate removal.72 Once this evidence is
satisfied, a court may conclude that the child is in continuing
danger by remaining in the home, and a temporary order of
removal is therefore appropriate.73 This temporary removal
could lead to permanent removal of a child from the home.74
Thus, the high standards for temporary removal are another
safeguard for the parents in a termination proceeding. For
example, the Yearning for Zion Ranch case merely concerned a
temporary, as opposed to permanent, removal, and the Texas
Supreme Court held that there was no evidentiary basis for
69

Id.
Kent K. v. Bobby M., 110 P.3d 1013, 1015-16 (Ariz. 2005) (“The statue thus
clearly requires that the party seeking termination establish the grounds for
termination by clear and convincing evidence.”); In re A.C.G., 894 A.2d 436, 439 (D.C.
2006) (“Proofs made in a termination proceeding must satisfy the clear and convincing
evidence standard . . . that lies somewhere between a preponderance of evidence and
evidence probative beyond a reasonable doubt.” (internal quotation marks omitted)
(quoting In re K.A., 484 A.2d 992, 995 (D.C. 1984))).
71
See Holick v. Smith, 685 S.W.2d 18, 20 (Tex. 1985) (evidence supporting
termination must be clear and convincing (citing Santosky, 455 U.S. at 747-48)); In re
S.R.L., 243 S.W.3d 232, 235 (Tex. App. 2007) (“Parental rights can be terminated
involuntarily only by a showing of clear and convincing evidence.”); Colbert v. Dep’t of
Family and Protective Servs., 227 S.W.3d 799, 807 (Tex. App. 2006); Ybarra v. Tex.
Dep’t of Human Servs., 869 S.W.2d 574, 576 (Tex. App. 1993) (“Because the
termination of the parent-child relationship severs rights treasured by the law, strict
standards apply; evidence to meet those standards must be clear and convincing.”);
Hellman v. Kincy, 632 S.W.2d 216, 218 (Tex. App. 1982) (“[D]ue process requires that
the State support its allegations by at least clear and convincing evidence.” (internal
quotation marks omitted) (quoting Santosky, 455 U.S. at 747-48)).
72
TEX. FAM. CODE ANN. § 262.201(b) (Vernon 2008); see also In re Tex. Dep’t
of Family and Protective Servs., 255 S.W.3d 613, 614 (Tex. 2008).
73
TEX. FAM. CODE ANN. § 262.201(c); see also In re Tex. Dep’t. of Family and
Protective Servs., 255 S.W.3d at 614-15.
74
See TEX. FAM. CODE ANN. § 105.001; TEX. FAM. CODE ANN. § 161.206; TEX.
FAM. CODE ANN. § 262.201(c).
70
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temporary removal of the children from the Yearning for Zion
Ranch.75 The court found the belief system of the members of
the Ranch alone did not prove an immediate danger to the
health and safety of the children.76 Therefore, it is highly
unlikely that this evidence would be sufficient to satisfy the
clear and convincing standard in a permanent termination
proceeding.
B.

The First Amendment: The Parent’s Rights to Control
the Child’s Religious Upbringing

As part of a parent’s fundamental right to the custody
and control of his or her child, as established in Meyer v.
Nebraska and Prince v. Massachusetts, a parent has the right
to control the child’s religious upbringing.77 This right,
grounded in the Fourteenth Amendment, is further protected
by the First Amendment’s Establishment and Free Exercise
clauses.78 The Court has interpreted these clauses to include
the notion that parents are entitled to the protection of their
religious beliefs in raising their children.79
A pivotal case demonstrating the extent to which a
parent has a right to control his or her child’s religious
upbringing is Wisconsin v. Yoder. In this case, Amish parents
refused to enroll their children in any public or private school
after completing the eighth grade, thereby violating Wisconsin’s
mandatory school-attendance law.80 As a result, the parents were
convicted and fined for violating the state statute.81 The parents
brought suit on the grounds that their First and Fourteenth
75

In re Tex. Dep’t of Family and Protective Servs., 255 S.W.3d at 615.
In re Steed, No. 03-08-00235-CV, 2008 WL 2132014, at *4 (Tex. App. May
22, 2008), aff’d sub nom. In re Tex. Dep’t of Family and Protective Servs., 255 S.W.3d
613 (Tex. 2008).
77
CHEMERINSKY, supra note 20, at 778-79.
78
U.S. CONST. amend. I. The First Amendment is applied to the states
through the Fourteenth Amendment. Wisconsin v. Yoder, 406 U.S. 205, 207 (1972). The
First Amendment is divided into two clauses: the Establishment Clause and the Free
Exercise Clause. The Establishment Clause can be interpreted in a number of different
ways. However, it is often interpreted to mean that the government cannot use religion
as a ground for its action or inaction or favor one religion over another. CHEMERINSKY,
supra note 20, at 1193, 1196 (3d ed. 2006). The Free Exercise Clause provides that the
government will not interfere with an individual’s right to believe nor the individual’s
right to act in regards to religious beliefs. Id. at 1247.
79
See Yoder, 406 U.S. at 233; Jennifer Ann Drobac, For the Sake of the
Children: Court Consideration of Religion in Child Custody Cases, 50 STAN. L. REV.
1609, 1614 (1998).
80
Yoder, 406 U.S. at 207.
81
Id. at 208.
76
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Amendment rights were violated due to the fact that enrollment
in high school violated the Amish belief system.82 The Supreme
Court held that Wisconsin’s requirement of education after the
eighth grade violated the Amish parents’ free exercise of their
religious beliefs.83 In so deciding, the Court established that the
free exercise of religion includes the right of parents to control
the religious upbringing of their children84 and that the parent’s
right to religious upbringing trumps the right of the state to
require child education.85
Nonetheless, the right of parents to control the religious
upbringing of their children is not absolute.86 In Prince v.
Massachusetts, an aunt, having custodianship over her niece,
brought the young girl with her to distribute Jehovah’s Witness
material, in violation of the state’s child labor laws.87 Although
the Court recognized that children have the right to exercise
their religious beliefs and that parents have the right to
promote religious education for their children,88 the right to
exercise religion is not beyond state limitation.89 The state may
limit parental freedoms where the child’s welfare is affected,
even if the freedoms include religious conviction.90 Exercising
its police powers, the state has a right to limit child labor by

82

Id. at 208-09. The Amish religion supports the belief that in order to have
salvation, members of the religion must live in a church community that is separate
from the world. Id. at 210. The Amish believe in a simple life that is in contradiction
with the typical contemporary ideals, which praise material success and individuality
as opposed to community. Id. There is a pervasive belief in the Amish community that
a child’s attendance in high school provides “impermissible exposure of their children
to a ‘worldly’ influence in conflict with their beliefs.” Id. at 211. No objection is made by
the Amish community to a child’s attendance of grades first through eighth because the
community believes that the children need to be taught the basic skills in order to be
good Amish citizens. Id. at 212. The parents in this case brought substantial expert
testimony about the beliefs and lifestyle of the Amish community in order for the court
to rule on the First Amendment claim. Id. at 209.
83
Id. at 219.
84
Drobac, supra note 79, at 1614.
85
Yoder, 406 U.S. at 214-15, 221-22.
86
See generally Prince v. Massachusetts, 321 U.S. 158 (1944) (holding that
exercising religious beliefs may not override child labor laws).
87
Id. at 160-61, 163. Under Massachusetts General Laws, it is illegal for any
person to furnish a minor with articles knowing that the minor intends to sell these
articles. Furthermore, it is illegal for a parent, guardian or custodian to encourage a
child to work in violation of child labor laws, including allowing a child under the age of
sixteen to work or to work long hours or work in the evening. MASS. GEN. LAWS ANN.
ch. 149 §§ 80-81 (West 2004).
88
Prince, 321 U.S. at 165.
89
Id. at 166.
90
Id. at 167.
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placing restrictions on when and where children may work,
even if their work consists of furthering their religious beliefs.91
Although Yoder and Prince appear to be diametrically
opposed, it is possible to distinguish the propositions for which
they stand and to create a rule regarding state intervention in
parental religious rights. The determining factor underlying
the different outcomes in each case is the nature of the law
violated by the parents’ religious practice. For instance, in
Prince, Sarah Prince’s First Amendment right to allow her
niece to distribute religious pamphlets conflicted with the
state’s child labor laws.92 In limiting Prince’s right to control
her niece’s practice of religion, the Court held that child labor
was “among evils . . . [whose] crippling effects” require state
action to protect the “healthy, well-rounded growth” of
children.93 However, in Yoder, the conflict arose from a state
statute requiring mandatory school attendance for students
from grades one through twelve.94 In finding in favor of the
Amish parents, the Court decided that non-compliance with the
mandatory school attendance statute was not a threat to the
social welfare of the child.95 The Court was concerned that by
forcing the Amish children to attend school, the state would
undermine the Amish community’s religious beliefs by
influencing and shaping the beliefs of their children through
education.96 According to the Yoder Court, this was the “kind of
objective danger to the free exercise of religion that the First
Amendment was designed to prevent.”97
Indeed, the Yoder Court distinguished the facts of the
case from the Prince decision. In refusing to afford weight to
the State’s argument that exempting Amish children from the
school attendance requirement deprived the children of their
right to secondary education, the Court noted that this right is
not comparable to the “evils” associated with child labor.98
Accordingly, the rule suggested by these two cases is that
unless the state can show a compelling interest in protecting

91
92
93
94
95
96
97
98

Id. at 168-69.
Id. at 159.
Id. at 168.
Wisconsin v. Yoder, 406 U.S. 205, 207 n.2 (1972).
Drobac, supra note 79, at 1615.
Yoder, 406 U.S. at 218.
Id.
Id. at 229-30.
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the child’s welfare, such as preventing child labor, the parent’s
First Amendment claim will prevail.99
C.

Considering Religion in Child Custody Cases

In child custody proceedings, the state has a compelling
interest to protect the welfare of the child involved;100 thus,
parents generally do not have a valid First Amendment claim
when the court considers the religion of the parents in custody
proceedings. The Court in Prince qualified its decision by
stating that its ruling did “not extend beyond the facts [of] the
case” and did not give the states license to justify intervention
in religious activities on behalf of children “in the name of
health and welfare.”101 Nonetheless, since the Prince decision,
courts have carefully examined the religious beliefs of parents
in child custody cases.102 In divorce proceedings involving child
custody disputes, the courts have looked to religion as one
factor to determine the fitness of each parent to care for the
child.103 The standard used by many courts is that a parent’s
religious activity will not be a factor when it is clear that the
child will not be harmed from the religious activity.104 As one
court noted, “[s]o long as a court makes findings as to a child’s
actual needs respecting religion, the court may consider such
needs, as one factor, in awarding custody.”105 Thus, the courts
are using a standard derived from Prince and Yoder—the
child’s welfare must be at stake in order to deprive parents of

99

See Drobac, supra note 79, at 1615 (“The [Yoder] decision suggests that
absent a showing that a parent’s actions will ‘jeopardize’ the child’s health or safety, a
court may not regulate or restrict the religious behaviors of the parent.”). However,
since the decision in Yoder, the Court has held that laws which are facially neutral
with regard to religion will be considered valid. See id. at 1617. While this is the
current state of the law regarding free exercise of religion, it is not of much use in child
custody cases because these cases involve the parent’s fundamental right to the
upbringing of their children and thus the heightened standard is still necessary. See id.
100
See supra note 38 and accompanying text.
101
Prince v. Massachusetts, 321 U.S. 158, 171 (1944).
102
See George L. Blum, Annotation, Religion as a Factor in Child Custody
Cases, 124 A.L.R. 5TH 203 (2004); see also Lauren C. Miele, Note, Big Love or Big
Problem: Should Polygamous Relationships Be a Factor in Determining Child Custody,
43 NEW ENG. L. REV. 105, 122-23 (2008) (discussing religious considerations in child
custody proceedings).
103
Miele, supra note 102, at 122.
104
Id. at 123.
105
Bonjour v. Bonjour, 592 P.2d 1233, 1240 (Alaska 1979) (citing Wojnarowicz
v. Wojnarowicz, 137 A.2d 618, 621 (N.J. Super. Ct. Ch. Div. 1958)).

2009]

YEARNING FOR ZION RANCH RAID

319

their right to care and custody of their child on the grounds of
their religious beliefs.106
For example, in Colopy v. Colopy, the Massachusetts
Supreme Court considered the religious needs of children in a
custody dispute.107 In this case, the father was awarded custody
of the couple’s five children.108 Prior to the proceeding, the
couple had lived at a religious center as part of a religious
community.109 However, as a result of a change in the rules of
the community, the couple was no longer allowed to live as
husband and wife, and the children were separated from their
parents and each other and forced to live with other adults in
the community.110 When the mother refused to leave the
religious center, the court found that it was in the best interest
of the children to award custody to the father, who had left the
community and established a home in mainstream society.111
As evidenced in Colopy v. Colopy, in order for religion to
be considered in a child custody hearing, it must pose an
extreme threat to a child’s safety or welfare. Simply practicing
a religion that promotes seemingly unorthodox beliefs is not
enough to infringe upon a parent’s right to control the religious
upbringing of his or her children. For instance, in Burnham v.
Burnham, the Nebraska court considered the religious beliefs
of the parents in determining custody of the child in a divorce
proceeding.112 In this case, the mother of the child practiced
Catholicism of the Tridentine Church of Fatima Crusaders.113
Under this religion, the woman’s marriage to the child’s father
was not legitimate because they were not married in the
Fatima Crusader Church.114 Consequently, the mother believed
the child to be illegitimate.115 She also believed that she was
106

See supra note 99 and accompanying text.
Colopy v. Colopy, 203 N.E.2d 546, 547 (Mass. 1964).
108
Id.
109
Id.
110
Id.
111
Id.
112
Burnham v. Burnham, 304 N.W.2d 58, 61 (Neb. 1981). “The courts
preserve an attitude of impartiality between religions and will not disqualify a parent
because of his or her religious beliefs.” Id. (internal quotation marks omitted) (quoting
Goodman v. Goodman, 141 N.W.2d 445, 448 (Neb. 1966)). “However, we do have a duty
to consider whether such beliefs threaten the health or well-being of the child.” Id.
113
Id. at 60.
114
Id.
115
Id. It is worth noting that the parents were actually married in the
Catholic Church before the birth of their child; however, because it is not the Fatima
Crusaders Church, it was not seen in the eyes of the mother as legitimate. Id.
107
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“bound . . . [by] mortal sin to educate her child in the . . .
Church.”116 The school connected with the Tridentine Church
allowed for corporal punishment and strict discipline and
required a parental waiver releasing the school of all liability
in case of an unforeseen accident.117 The mother stated that it
was her intention to send the child to this school because
failure to do so would result in her excommunication from the
Church.118 Additionally, the mother’s brother was ostracized
from the family by the mother and her own parents for his
failure to convert from Catholicism to the Church of
Tridentine.119 She testified that if her daughter was to decide
that she did not want to be a part of the Church of Tridentine,
she would be willing to cut the child from her life.120
Based on these facts, the court held that it was
obligated to consider the religious beliefs of the mother in
determining who should be awarded custody.121 In considering
the mother’s religious beliefs, the court decided that these
beliefs could possibly have an adverse impact on the
upbringing of the child.122 Namely, the belief that the child was
illegitimate and the fact that the mother would be willing to
cut the child out of her life caused the court to conclude that
the father should be awarded custody of the child.123
The above-mentioned cases are not the exception to the
124
many state courts find that religion can be a
norm,
determining factor in child custody suits.125 Thus, based on the
116

Id.
Id.
118
Id.
119
Id.
120
Id. at 61.
121
Id.
122
Id.
123
Id. at 61-62.
124
Although these cases are not the exception to the norm, some courts still
refuse to look at religion as a factor in determining the custody placement of a child.
See Alaniz v. Alaniz, 867 S.W.2d 54, 56-57 (Tex. App. 1993) (holding that awarding
custody on the premise that one parent’s religion is more normal than the other
parent’s is not proper); In re Marriage of Knighton, 723 S.W.2d 274, 285 (Tex. App.
1987) (holding that the test for determining the custody of a child is the “‘best interest
of the child’” test and not the religious beliefs of the mother without evidential proof
that these beliefs were illegal or caused harm to the child (citing TEX. FAM. CODE ANN.
§ 14.07(a) (Vernon 1986))); Blum, supra note 102.
125
See Kendall v. Kendall, 687 N.E.2d 1228, 1235-36 (Mass. 1997) (holding
that when the children had been brought up in the Jewish faith, it was proper for the
court to limit their exposure to the father’s Christian beliefs as a matter of custody
provisions); Graci v. Graci, 187 A.D.2d 970, 973 (N.Y. App. Div. 1992) (holding that the
mother’s religious education of the children contributed to her home being a superior
117
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above examples, courts have the ability to consider religion in
child custody cases without infringing upon the First
Amendment rights of the parents.126 If the courts can apply
religion as a factor in determining the outcome for child custody
disputes without violating the First Amendment, then by logical
extension, the courts can apply religion to parental termination
proceedings without violating the First Amendment.
II.

SUPPORT FOR TERMINATION UNDER THE CURRENT LAW

Where there is a pervasive religious belief throughout a
community condoning child abuse,127 the burden of proof should
be lowered from the clear and convincing standard to a
preponderance of the evidence standard. However, even under
the current evidentiary standard there is support for the
removal of children who have not been abused but where
abusive religious beliefs are present in a communal living
arrangement.
A.

Applying Religion to Termination Proceedings

Considering religion in parental termination proceedings is
a necessary step towards lowering the standard of proof for
termination of parental custody rights in cases where a pervasive
belief system in a community condones child abuse. However, the
application of religion as a factor in child custody proceedings has
been confined mostly to individual child custody disputes, usually
arising out of divorce.128 The religious beliefs of a child’s parents are
generally not a factor in parental termination proceedings because
for termination to occur, the state must prove that “the child is
subjected to real physical or emotional harm and less drastic
measures would be unavailing.”129 Typically, grounds for

environment for the children); Aldous v. Aldous, 99 A.D.2d 197, 200 (N.Y. App. Div.
1984) (holding that religion was one factor among many in determining the custody of
the child). See generally Blum, supra note 102. Other courts have also utilized religion
as a factor in custody determination hearings.
126
See generally Blum, supra note 102.
127
See discussion infra notes 152-157 and accompanying text.
128
See supra Part I.C.
129
Roe v. Conn, 417 F. Supp. 769, 779 (M.D. Ala. 1976). Although religion is
generally not the main factor in parental termination proceedings, in some cases,
religion is a motivating factor. See In re State ex rel. Black, 283 P.2d 887, 913 (Utah
1955). However, these types of cases historically involved other strong factors
warranting removal. For instance, in In re State ex rel. Black, the Blacks’ religion
dictated that the family engage in illegal polygamous behavior. Id. at 903.
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termination result from “severe or chronic abuse or neglect.”130 For
example, sexual abuse including anything from fondling to sexual
intercourse is considered a crime and gives the state grounds to
intervene “under its parens patriae authority.”131 Additionally,
emotional abuse resulting in diminished psychological functioning
or failure to thrive or control aggressive behavior also may result in
state protection of the child.132 Thus, more often than not, physical
or emotional abuse is the focus of a termination proceeding rather
than the ideological beliefs of the parents involved.
However, religion often plays an indirect role in
termination proceedings when it is the source of abuse or
neglect. For example, in In re Edward C, the California Court
of Appeals considered evidence that the children had been
physically abused because they were being hit with a strap and
“lectured about God at mealtimes for so long that they often fell
asleep without eating.”133 In defending his actions, the father
explained that “he loved and treated his children equally and
that God directed his discipline of them.”134 Thus, while the
court did not specifically base its termination decision on the
religious beliefs of the father, it was the effect of those beliefs
that led to the permanent termination of his rights. In response
to the parents’ claim that their religious freedoms prevented
the court from infringing upon the upbringing of their children,
the court stated that “mistreatment of a child . . . is not
privileged because it is imposed in the guise of freedom of
religious expression.”135 Therefore, while on its face religion is
not generally considered in parental termination proceedings,
its effect on the treatment of children will be a factor in
determining whether a parent should maintain his or her
custodial rights.

130

LESLIE J. HARRIS & LEE E. TEITELBAUM, CHILDREN, PARENTS, AND THE
LAW: PUBLIC AND PRIVATE AUTHORITY IN THE HOME, SCHOOLS, AND JUVENILE COURTS
841 (2002).
131
FRIEDMAN, supra note 60, at 136. Parens patriae is the doctrine invoked by
courts that treats the state as a parent to a child by asserting jurisdiction over the
child. DAVID J. ROTHMAN, CONSCIENCE AND CONVENIENCE: THE ASYLUM AND ITS
ALTERNATIVES IN PROGRESSIVE AMERICA 205-07, 210 (1980), reprinted in HARRIS &
TEITELBAUM, supra note 130, at 322 n.1, 323 (2002).
132
FRIEDMAN, supra note 60, at 138.
133
Id. at 134; see also In re Edward C., 178 Cal. Rptr. 694, 697 (Cal. Ct. App. 1981).
134
In re Edward C., 178 Cal. Rptr. at 698; see also FRIEDMAN, supra note 60,
at 134.
135
In re Edward C., 178 Cal. Rptr. at 699; see also FRIEDMAN, supra note 60,
at 135.
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Another case considering religion in custodial
termination proceedings arose out of the Short Creek raid.136
The court ruled that the removal of children from the care of
their parents was appropriate in In re State in Interest of
Black.137 This case involved a family living on the Utah side of
Short Creek, rather than the Arizona side, and subject to the
Utah courts’ jurisdiction.138 In this case, Leonard Black and
Vera Johnson were deprived of the custody and control of their
children resulting from an unlawful polygamous marriage.139
The court held that exposing the children to “[t]he practice of
polygamy, unlawful cohabitation and adultery”140 constituted
child neglect because the parents failed to offer “the proper
maintenance, care, training and education contemplated and
required by law and morals.”141 Effectively, the court found that
the parents created an environment that was not conducive to
the proper upbringing of children through their unlawful
practice of polygamy.142 As such, the court conclusively
determined that religious beliefs and practices will not be
afforded constitutional protection when they are in conflict
with the laws of the nation and result in detriment to the
child’s welfare.
Applying the foregoing facts to the Yearning for Zion
case, the religious beliefs of the residents of the Ranch would
likely not be considered as a prima facie factor for termination.
However, the effects of the beliefs held by members of the
Ranch are certainly relevant to a termination proceeding.143
Specifically, a group of pubescent, underage girls at the Ranch
were spiritually married.144 This “effect” of the religion is a clear
136

See supra notes 13-19 and accompanying text.
In re State ex rel. Black, 283 P.2d 887, 913 (Utah 1955).
138
Whereas most of the custody hearings for children taken from their
parents in Short Creek were held under Arizona’s jurisdiction and ultimately led to
custody being placed with the parents as a result of due process violations, this case
was tried separately in the Utah state courts and thus avoided constitutional
infringements. Id. at 888.
139
Id.
140
Id. at 913.
141
Id. at 895.
142
As a result of the court’s findings, Vera Johnson was deprived of her right
to custody of her children and only upon a showing that she was no longer living with
Leonard Black would she be granted temporary custody of the children. Id. at 913.
143
Miele, supra note 102, at 132-34 (discussing the impact of polygamy and
the belief system surrounding the practice in child custody hearings).
144
Spiritually married refers to the fact that girls and women on the Ranch
were not legally married to their “husbands.” Rather they were spiritually married
typically in a polygamous household. In re Tex. Dep’t of Family and Protective Servs.,
137
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violation of Texas law prohibiting sexual conduct with a minor
and constitutes traditional sexual abuse, which is a ground for
parental termination.145 In fact, the court acknowledged that
sexual abuse was established as to these girls on the basis of
the evidence of their pregnancies and involvement in underage
sexual intercourse as condoned by the belief system of the
Yearning for Zion Ranch community.146
However, as to the other female children (not among the
group identified as having been sexually abused), the court
specifically found there to be no abuse or threat to the physical
health or safety of these children.147 The court held that, absent
any evidence of a danger to the physical health or safety of the
children, the belief system of the Ranch was not enough to
warrant interference by the state.148 Similarly, the court decided
that there was no threat to boys on the Ranch because there
were no signs of any physical or sexual abuse.149 Thus, the court
decided that the religious beliefs of the residents on the
Yearning for Zion Ranch did not constitute strong enough
evidence to warrant removal of the children that had not been
physically abused.150
Justice O’Neill, joined by Justices Willet and Johnson,
concurred with the court’s ruling that the Texas Department of
Family and Protective Services failed to provide evidence of an
imminent danger to the children’s health and safety as it
related to boys and pre-pubescent females.151 However, Justice
O’Neill disagreed with the majority’s holding that there was no

255 S.W.3d 613, 616 n.1 (Tex. 2008) (O’Neill, J., concurring in part and dissenting in
part).
145
See id. See generally FRIEDMAN, supra note 60, at 136-38.
146
In re Steed, No. 03-08-00235-CV, 2008 WL 2132014, at *2 (Tex. App. May
22, 2008), aff’d sub nom. In re Tex. Dep’t of Family and Protective Servs., 255 S.W.3d
613 (Tex. 2008). As to the five female children alleged to have suffered sexual abuse,
they were not among the children the court considered in the petition for mandamus
and the court as much as conceded that these five females were sexually abused,
stating “[w]ith the exception of the five female children identified as having become
pregnant between the ages of fifteen and seventeen, there was no evidence of any
physical abuse or harm to any other child.” Id. at *2.
147
Id. at *3.
148
Id.
149
Id.
150
The five female children who showed signs of sexual abuse were not
included in the court’s decision. These female children were not the children of the
parents petitioning for a writ of mandamus. Id.
151
In re Tex. Dep’t of Family and Protective Servs., 255 S.W.3d 613, 616 (Tex.
2008) (O’Neill, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part).
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evidence that pubescent girls were in danger.152 Justice O’Neill
pointed to the high number of girls on the Ranch under
eighteen years old who were pregnant, had given birth, or were
“spiritually married.”153 She also noted that under the
standards of the Ranch, girls were never too young to be
married or to have children and that the religious leader of the
sect had the power to decide when and to whom a girl would be
married.154 Further evidence was offered that under the Texas
Penal Code, child abuse occurs when a person engages in
sexual conduct with a child under the age of seventeen who is
not the legal spouse of that individual.155 Given this definition,
the girls from the Yearning for Zion Ranch fit under the
definition of sexual abuse because they were not legally
married to their “husbands,” but rather were only spiritually
married.156 Based on this evidence of a “pattern or practice of
sexual abuse,” Justice O’Neill concluded that all the pubescent
girls at the Ranch were in danger of sexual abuse and
therefore, removal from the Ranch and their parents was
appropriate.157
Contrary to the majority’s opinion, Justice O’Neill found
that the religious beliefs did “present[] evidence that ‘there was
a danger to the physical health or safety’ of pubescent girls on
the [Ranch].”158 Because the Ranch community believed in
polygamy, spiritual marriage, and impregnating girls under
152

Justice O’Neill found that the evidence of abuse in some of the pubescent
females created a “pattern or practice of sexual abuse, that ‘the urgent need for
protection required the immediate removal’ of those girls.” Id. (citing TEX. FAM. CODE
ANN. § 262.201(b)(1)-(3)).
153
In re Texas Department of Family and Protective Servs., 255 S.W.3d at 616
(O’Neill, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part).
154
Id. Justice O’Neill was persuaded by testimony from a child psychologist
that these practices constitute child abuse because children who are fifteen and sixteen
years old are “not sufficiently emotionally mature to enter a healthy consensual sexual
relationship or a ‘marriage.’” Id. The child psychologist also testified that the belief
system on the Ranch was such that all of the children exposed to these beliefs were in
danger, regardless of their age or gender. TEXAS DEPARTMENT OF FAMILY AND
PROTECTIVE SERVICES, ELDORADO INVESTIGATION 7 (2008) [hereinafter ELDORADO
INVESTIGATION].
155
TEX. PENAL CODE ANN. § 21.11(a)-(b) (Vernon 2003).
156
In re Tex. Dep’t of Family and Protective Servs., 255 S.W.3d at 616
(O’Neill, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part).
157
Id. at 616-17. Supporting her holding, Justice O’Neill cited Texas
Department of Human Services v. Boyd, where the court held that endangering a child
meant “more than a threat of metaphysical injury or the possible ill effects of a lessthan-ideal family environment, it is not necessary that the conduct be directed at the
child or that the child actually suffers injury.” Id. (quoting Tex. Dep’t of Human Servs.
v. Boyd, 727 S.W.2d 531, 533 (Tex. 1987)).
158
Id. at 616.
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the age of eighteen, Justice O’Neill found that there was
enough evidence to establish “a pattern or practice of sexual
abuse” and “that other such girls were at risk of sexual abuse
as well.”159 Similarly, the Texas Department of Family and
Protective Services made an ultimate finding that twelve girls,
or one out of every four, on the Ranch, were victims of sexual
abuse and that their parents were aware of this abuse.160 As a
result, the Department found that these twelve girls, along
with 262 other children on the Ranch, were victims of neglect
because their parents failed to remove them from situations
where they would be exposed to sexual abuse.161 Accordingly,
Justice O’Neill’s opinion and the Department of Family and
Protective Services’ findings suggests that religious beliefs
serve as a factor in establishing a pattern of sexual abuse that
can extend beyond just the abused children to other children at
risk of the same behavior.162 Therefore, in considering the
religious convictions of the FLDS members at the Yearning for
Zion Ranch, it is possible to conclude that their religious beliefs
condone statutory rape resulting from the adherence to
“spiritually marrying” underage girls. Given this conclusion,
removal of these children was warranted because the Ranch
provided an unsafe atmosphere and created a risk of harm to
all the children on the Ranch.
B.

Analogizing the Yearning for Zion Ranch to a Family

The children at the Yearning for Zion Ranch were
properly removed from their parents by the Department of
Family and Protective Services due to the fact that the
community as a whole condoned sexual abuse among some of
the children. The Texas Supreme Court should have
characterized the Ranch as a family in order to justify removal
of the remaining children who were not abused but are at risk
for future abuse. Conversely, the Texas Supreme Court
determined that there was not sufficient evidence to warrant
removal of most of the children from the Yearning for Zion
Ranch because there was no apparent physical abuse as to
these children individually.163 However, the court failed to
159
160
161
162
163

Id. at 616-17.
ELDORADO INVESTIGATION, supra note 154, at 4.
Id.
See discussion infra Part II.B.
See generally In re Tex. Dep’t of Family and Protective Servs., 255 S.W.3d 613.
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consider the idea that individualized proof is not necessary.164
Courts and legislatures have authorized the removal of
children from parental care in cases where there was only
evidence that one sibling had been abused.165 Similarly, the
Texas Supreme Court should have characterized the Ranch as
a family in order to justify removal of the remaining children
who were not abused but are at risk for future abuse.
Cases where parents lose custody of all their children
based on evidence of abuse in only one child are justified by
reasoning that if there is evidence of neglect or abuse in one
child, then it is likely that the other children are also victims of
abuse or neglect.166 One study showed that in almost half of the
families where abuse was present, more than one child was
abused.167 This same study also demonstrated that the
likelihood of the abuse reoccurring was high.168 Other similar
164

See, e.g., N.Y. FAM. CT. ACT § 1046(a)(i) (Consol. 1999) (“[P]roof of the
abuse or neglect of one child shall be admissible evidence on the issue of the abuse or
neglect of any other child of, or the legal responsibility of, the respondent . . . .”).
165
In Maryland, the Court of Special Appeals held that removal of one child
based on neglect of a sibling was appropriate. In re William B., 533 A.2d. 16, 21 (Md.
Ct. Spec. App. 1987) (“The parents’ ability to care for the needs of one child is probative
of their ability to care for other children in the family.”). In support of its holding, the
court stated that authorities should not have to wait until a child suffers abuse or
neglect to determine that the parents are unfit. See id. Although such a finding must
be adduced by actual evidence, “the fear of harm” may be enough to remove a child
from parental custody. Id. Similarly, a New York court held that “proof of the abuse or
neglect of one child is admissible evidence on the issue of abuse or neglect of a sibling
and in appropriate cases it can be sufficient alone to sustain a finding of abuse or
neglect.” In re Kimberly H., 242 A.D.2d 35, 36, 38 (N.Y. App. Div. 1998) (where an
infant was taken from her mother on derivative grounds due to the fact that the
mother had already had her three other children taken from her recently as a result of
her beating one of the children with a belt). The court further explained that when a
prior finding of abuse is close enough in time to the current proceeding, the condition of
abuse is presumed to still exist. Id. at 36. In Texas, the relevant statute states:
In determining whether there is a continuing danger to the physical health or
safety of the child, the court may consider whether the household to which
the child would be returned includes a person who: (1) has abused or
neglected another child in a manner that caused serious injury to or the
death of the other child; or (2) has sexually abused another child.
TEX. FAM. CODE ANN. § 262.201(d)(1)-(2) (Vernon 2008).
166
See generally DONALD T. KRAMER, 2 LEGAL RIGHTS OF CHILDREN § 16:38
(2008); Robin Fretwell Wilson, The Cradle of Abuse: Evaluating the Danger Posed by a
Sexually Predatory Parent to the Victim’s Siblings, 51 EMORY L.J. 241, 244, 255 (2002)
(discussing social science studies tending to show abuse in one child leads to a
presumption of abuse in the child’s siblings).
167
In over forty-five percent of the families studied, more than one child in the
family suffered abuse. Roy C. Herrenkohl et al., The Repetition of Child Abuse: How
Frequently Does It Occur?, 3 CHILD ABUSE & NEGLECT 72 (1979).
168
Id. (incidents of abuse were reported in 18.5% of the 206 families studied
whose cases had been closed, while reoccurrence, the repetition of abuse, was an even
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studies demonstrate that where one child is abused, there is an
increased likelihood that other children in the household are
also being abused.169 Yet another study found that one-third to
one-half of cases involving sexual abuse involved abuse of
another relative as well.170 Despite these alarming figures, they
may actually underestimate the true number of children
suffering from abuse because often abuse goes unreported.171
These studies further substantiate the idea that where one
child in a family is abused, another child is probably also at
risk because abuse towards the sibling could have gone
unreported. Based on these studies it is possible to conclude
that where there is abuse in one child, there is a presumption
of abuse in the other children. Furthermore, even if that child
has not also been abused or neglected, a home where family
violence is present is not a safe atmosphere for the child.172
Thus, courts often are willing to terminate parental custody in
cases where there is no evidence of abuse towards one child but
there is clear and convincing evidence of abuse towards the
child’s sibling.173 The issue in these cases becomes not whether
the child has been abused, but whether the child is likely to be
abused and, therefore, the court has discretion to protect the
children in an abusive household.174 Based on the
characteristics and practices of the members at the Ranch, it is
possible to analogize the Yearning for Zion Ranch community
more serious problem); see also Edward D. Farber et al., The Sexual Abuse of Children:
A Comparison of Male and Female Victims, 13 J. CLINICAL CHILD PSYCHOL. 294, 296
(1984) (“Forty-three percent (43%) of the children in this study reported having been
molested on two or more occasions.”); Wilson, supra note 166, at 255-58.
169
For a discussion on studies showing incest and sexual abuse see Wilson,
supra note 166, at 256-58.
170
DIANA E.H. RUSSELL, THE SECRET TRAUMA 242 (1986). A further study
found that in one-fourth of cases involving abuse towards a child, the sibling was also
abused. See Wilson, supra note 166, at 257.
171
RUSSELL, supra note 170; Farber et al., supra note 168, at 294; see also
Wilson, supra note 166, at 256.
172
See supra note 165.
173
In re Baby Boy Santos, 336 N.Y.S.2d 817, 820 (N.Y. Fam. Ct. 1972)
(holding that there was sufficient evidence to terminate the parental custody rights for
a baby boy given the significant amount of abuse his sister had suffered even though he
had not personally suffered abuse); see also In re Interest of M.B., 480 N.W.2d 160,
161-62 (Neb. 1992) (“If evidence of the fault or habits of a parent or custodian indicates
a risk of harm to a child, the juvenile court may properly take jurisdiction of that child,
even though the child has not yet been harmed or abused.”).
174
In re Baby Boy Santos, 336 N.Y.S.2d at 819-20 (“It has been the experience
of the Court, as well as authorities in the subject of child abuse, that there is in effect a
‘child abuse syndrome’ and that when one abused child is removed from the home, that
another child in the home may become the object of abuse by the parent.” (citations
omitted)).
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to a family.175 In doing so, there is support for removal of all the
children despite a lack of physical abuse in each child.176
The Texas Department of Family and Protective
Services did argue that the Yearning for Zion Ranch
constituted the equivalent of a household for the purposes of a
custody proceeding. However, the Texas Appellate Court
rejected this argument and the Texas Supreme Court
affirmed.177 The Appellate Court stated that the notion that the
Ranch comprised one household was contrary to the evidence,
which showed that there were separate living arrangements
and separate family groups.178 Contrary to the court’s opinion,
the living arrangements at the Ranch indicate otherwise.
Notably, the members of the Yearning for Zion Ranch do
not all live in a single unit; they live in a guarded, concrete
compound within which there are several housing units.179
Although this is not a traditional single dwelling unit, it is similar
to one in that the aggregate of the individual housing units within
the locked compound equal one large estate.180 Furthermore, the
fact that the Ranch does not allow outsiders into the compound
makes it similar to the family dwelling that restricts outsiders
unless they have been invited to enter the dwelling.181
The court also incorrectly pointed to the existence of
separate family groups to reject the notion that the Ranch
constitutes a family. Adherents to the FLDS religion encourage
the practice of polygamy, allowing a male to take several wives
and have multiple children with each wife.182 As such, it is
difficult to distinguish separate family groups amongst the mix
of husbands with several wives and children. In fact, because it
was facially unclear which child belonged to which parents, the
residents of the Ranch were compelled to participate in DNA
175

See infra notes 192-196 and accompanying text.
See supra notes 165-173 and accompanying text.
177
In re Steed, No. 03-08-00235-CV, 2008 WL 2132014, at *3 (Tex. App. May
22, 2008), aff’d sub nom. In re Tex. Dep’t of Family and Protective Servs., 255 S.W.3d
613 (Tex. 2008).
178
Id. at *3 n.10.
179
See id. at *3; Gretel C. Kovach & Andrew Murr, Trouble in the Hills,
NEWSWEEK, Apr. 10, 2008, available at http://www.newsweek.com/id/131379/page/1;
Simon Romero, Wary Texans Keep Their Eyes on the Compound of a Polygamous Sect,
N.Y. TIMES, Nov. 14, 2004.
180
See Romero, supra note 179, at 1.
181
See Kovach & Murr, supra note 179.
182
David Von Drehle, The Texas Polygamist Sect: Uncoupled and
Unchartered, TIME, Apr. 24, 2008, available at http://www.time.com/time/magazine/
article/0,9171,1734818-2,00.html.
176
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testing to determine the correct lineage of the children.183 The
practice of polygamy and the refusal of the Ranch members to
procreate with “outsiders” has created in-breeding184 and an
undeniable biological link between many of the Yearning for
Zion residents.
Moreover, there are other factors that weigh in favor of
the Yearning for Zion Ranch community being treated as a
family. The traditional notion of family includes a husband and
wife, legally married and living together with their children.185
However, a family can also consist of unrelated individuals
residing together.186 Some of the key factors that courts consider
in establishing a family relationship are whether there is
“stability, permanency and [a] functional lifestyle which is
equivalent to that of the traditional family unit.”187 For
instance, a group of college students living together were
considered a family because they had renewable leases and an
intention to remain in the living unit through the completion of
their degrees.188 They also “ate together, shared household
chores, and paid expenses from a common fund.”189 In contrast,
a group-home was not considered a family because the staff
worked for the home on a rotating basis, which caused a lack of
stability.190 Also, the residents lived at the home for only a short
period of time, thereby creating a lack of permanency.191

183

Kirk Johnson, DNA Is Taken From Sect’s Children, N.Y. TIMES, Apr. 22,
2008, at A19.
184
See Sara Corbett, Children of God, N.Y. TIMES, July 27, 2008, at MM1;
Johnson, supra note 183.
185
See Alison Harvison Young, Reconceiving the Family: Challenging the
Paradigm of the Exclusive Family, 6 AM. U. J. GENDER & L. 505, 506 (1998). For
discussion of the contemporary divergence from the traditional conception of the family
see generally JANET L. DOLGIN, DEFINING THE FAMILY: LAW, TECHNOLOGY, AND
REPRODUCTION IN AN UNEASY AGE (1997) and Chris Snow, Book Note, Defining the
Family: The Family in Transition, 1 J.L. & FAM. STUD. 287 (1999).
186
Penobscot Area Housing Dev. Corp. v. City of Brewer, 434 A.2d 14, 21-22
(Me. 1981); Borough of Glassboro v. Vallorosi, 568 A.2d 888, 894 (N.J. 1990).
187
Borough of Glassboro, 568 A.2d at 894.
188
Id.
189
Id. Although in a similar case, a group of college students were not
considered a single family because they were not related by blood, adoption or
marriage. However, this case involved an ordinance, which the Supreme Court upheld
as not violating any constitutional right that specifically required that the individuals
be related by blood, adoption or marriage. See Vill. of Belle Terre v. Boraas, 416 U.S. 1,
2-3, 9 (1974). In the present case, there is no ordinance in question that limits the
definition of families to relation by blood, adoption or marriage.
190
Penobscot Area Housing Dev. Corp., 434 A.2d at 21-22.
191
Id.
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Applying these factors here, the Yearning for Zion
Ranch resembles a family due to the unique characteristics of
the Ranch members’ lifestyle. The Ranch community exudes
“stability, permanency and [a] functional lifestyle which is
equivalent to that of the traditional family unit.”192 Similar to
the college students deemed to satisfy the definition of a family
because of their functioning as a family-type unit, the residents
of the Ranch also function as a family-type unit.193 In particular,
the Ranch has communal facilities such as a garden where
residents can grow fruit and vegetables to share, a milk barn, a
cheese factory, and other establishments meant for sustaining
the community.194 The maintenance and use of these
establishments in a communal fashion for the benefit of
everyone at the Ranch is comparable to the college students
sharing chores for the maintenance and benefit of the entire
house in a familial manner.195 Additionally, unlike the group
home where the rotation of staff members undermined
stability, the Yearning for Zion Ranch has religious leaders
that act as patriarchal figures.196 Therefore, the Yearning for
Zion Ranch is more similar to a family than a shared home.
Even if it is accepted that the Ranch constitutes a
family, the issue of whether or not the belief system on the
Ranch creates a dangerous atmosphere for the children is still
debated.197 Similar to a family, the residents of the Ranch share
192

Borough of Glassboro, 568 A.2d at 894.
See id.
194
From Hunting Ground to Polygamist Ranch, CBS NEWS, Apr. 18, 2008,
http://www.cbsnews.com/stories/2008/04/18/national/main4028781.shtml [hereinafter
Hunting Ground to Polygamist Ranch] (detailing the initial establishment of the
Yearning for Zion Ranch by members of FLDS); Stephanie Sinclair, Inside Their World,
N.Y. TIMES MAGAZINE, July 27, 2008, available at http://www.nytimes.com/
slideshow/2008/07/27/magazine/0727-ZION_index.html.
195
See Borough of Glassboro, 568 A.2d at 894. Similar to the college students
who shared food and the responsibility of cooking and cleaning, members of the
Yearning for Zion Ranch also share the source of their food and the expense and labor
associated with their food source. See Hunting Ground to Polygamist Ranch, supra note
194; Sinclair, supra note 194.
196
See Penobscot Area Housing Dev. Corp, 434 A.2d at 21-22. The Yearning
for Zion Ranch is led by male religious leaders who dictate which men will marry which
women, what type of contact the members will have with modern products and the way
of life within the sect in general. See Hunting Ground to Polygamist Ranch, supra note
194; Kirk Johnson & Gretel C. Kovach, Daughter of Sect Leader Gets Additional
Protection, N.Y. TIMES, June 4, 2008, at A16; Kovach & Murr, supra note 179.
197
See, e.g., In re Tex. Dep’t of Family and Protective Servs., 255 S.W.3d 613,
616-17 (Tex. 2008) (O’Neill, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part); In re Steed,
No. 03-08-00235-CV, 2008 WL 2132014, at *3 n.10 (Tex. App. May 22, 2008), aff’d sub
nom. In re Tex. Dep’t of Family and Protective Servs., 255 S.W.3d 613 (Tex. 2008);
ELDORADO INVESTIGATION, supra note 154, at 6.
193
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religious beliefs and require specific rules in the upbringing of
children and the way of life in the Ranch.198 The Texas
Department of Family and Protective Services argued that the
existence of a “pervasive belief system” that condones young
girls “marry[ing], engag[ing] in sex, and bear[ing] children as
soon as they reach puberty” posed a threat of abuse to all the
children on the Ranch.199 In response, the Texas court held that
it was the beliefs and actions of certain individuals, and not the
community as a whole, that posed a danger to the children.200
However, as demonstrated in Yoder, courts will look at the
beliefs of the entire religious community as precedent for
determining how certain convictions will impact the
community.201 Thus, a court examining this case should find
that where members of a community, acting in a manner so as
to resemble a family, promulgate a belief that in practice
violates criminal statutes and constitutes sexual abuse of
children and other members fail to stop this abuse or report it
to authorities, the community has accepted this practice as a
whole. This behavior creates an unsafe atmosphere for all the
children exposed to it.
In summary, the case of the Yearning for Zion Ranch
can be analogized to a family for the purpose of removal in that
it is a closed community that resembles a household. Thus, if
some of the children on the Ranch are being abused and
therefore qualify for removal, the court should be able to
remove the other children because the possibility exists that
these children are or will be abused and the atmosphere is not
promoting the child’s welfare. However, because the Texas
court applied the requisite clear and convincing evidence
standard, the parents’ rights were not terminated and the
children were returned to an unsafe environment.

198

See Kovach & Murr, supra note 179.
In re Steed, 2008 WL 2132014, at *2 (internal quotation marks omitted).
200
Id. at *3. The Texas Appellate Court found that there was disagreement
amongst members of the Yearning for Zion Ranch on what is an appropriate age for
marriage. Id. at *3 n.9.
201
See Wisconsin v. Yoder, 406 U.S. 205, 209-12, 215, 219 (1972) (examining
the effect of compulsory school attendance past the age of sixteen on the upbringing of
children in the faith of the Old Order Amish religion).
199
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LOWERING THE EVIDENTIARY STANDARD

Currently, the standard for termination of parental
rights is the clear and convincing standard.202 However, in a
situation where a pervasive belief system in a closed
community, such as the Yearning for Zion Ranch, promotes
child abuse in some of the children, the standard of proof for
removal of the remainder of the children should be lowered.
Although the current state of the law does not promote this
assertion,203 the law should be revised in consideration of
important policy perspectives.
Requiring that the state prove by clear and convincing
evidence that the parent has either abused or neglected his or
her children or caused them some other irreparable harm
satisfies the Eldridge factors as to the parent.204 However, this
standard does not necessarily provide adequate protection for
the children involved.205 In granting parents greater protection
by requiring the state to prove abuse by clear and convincing
evidence, a potentially abused or neglected child is afforded
less protection. In some circumstances, this could mean that an
abused or neglected child is also being afforded less protection
because the evidence of abuse or neglect may not be apparent.
For instance, in DeShaney v. Winnebago County Department of
Social Services, a young boy was treated several times for
injuries caused by his father, prompting a physician to report
the injuries to the Department of Social Services.206 However,
based on the requirement that the state show clear and
convincing proof of abuse, the Department decided that there
was not sufficient evidence of abuse to require that the boy be
removed from the parent’s custody.207 Subsequently, the boy
suffered from continual abuse that led to permanent brain
damage and severe retardation.208 The rationale behind the
Department’s decision and the clear and convincing standard
in general is that just like it is better to let a guilty man go free
than to send an innocent man to prison in the criminal
202

See supra Part I.A.2.
See Santosky v. Kramer, 455 U.S. 745, 768-70 (1982).
204
See supra text accompanying note 33.
205
See Catherine J. Ross, Legal Constraints on Child-Saving: The Strange
Case of the Fundamentalist Latter-Day Saints at Yearning for Zion Ranch, 37 CAP. U.
L. REV. 361, 372-73 (2008).
206
DeShaney v. Winnebago County Dep’t. of Soc. Servs., 489 U.S. 189, 192-93 (1989).
207
Id.
208
Id. at 193.
203
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context,209 here too it is better to allow a child to stay with
parents who are abusive rather than to take a child away from
non-abusive parents. However, the situations are distinct
because in the criminal context the victim will likely never be
harmed again by a wrongly acquitted defendant whereas a
child is forced to continue living with his or her abusive parents
when the state fails to prove abuse or neglect by clear and
convincing evidence. Accordingly, the rationale in support of
protecting a parent’s fundamental rights and liberty interests
is upheld while the consequences to the child victim are not
even considered.
Returning to DeShaney v. Winnebago, the young boy’s
mother brought suit against the Department of Social Services
asserting a violation of the boy’s due process rights because the
state failed to intervene on the boy’s behalf to protect him from
his father’s abuse.210 The Court ruled against the child and held
that the Fourteenth Amendment Due Process Clause is meant
to protect individuals from state interference with their liberty
or property rights, as opposed to private interference from
private actors.211 Therefore, when the state’s interest and the
parent’s interest diverge, in that the parent is no longer looking
out for the health, safety, and welfare of the child, the child has
virtually no due process protection of his or her own interest in
being free from abuse.212 The Fourteenth Amendment protects
the parent’s interest against undue interference by the state,
while the clear and convincing standard places a heavy burden
on the state to interfere even when abuse may be present.
Justice Rehnquist, writing for the dissent in Santosky,
also found that the clear and convincing standard does not
adequately protect the child’s interest in remaining free from
abuse.213 While the majority opinion, in applying the Eldridge
factors, merely considered the private interests of the parent,
Justice Rehnquist also considered the private interest of the
child involved.214 Specifically, Justice Rehnquist reasoned that
the child has an interest independent from the parent in the

209

See In re Winship, 397 U.S. 358, 372 (1970) (Harlan, J., concurring).
DeShaney, 489 U.S. at 193.
211
Id. at 196-97.
212
Cf. id. at 202-03 (holding that the State was not required to protect a child
from abuse at the hands of his father).
213
See Santosky v. Kramer, 455 U.S. 745, 788-90 (1982) (Rehnquist, J.,
dissenting).
214
Id. at 788-90.
210
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outcome of a termination proceeding.215 While both the child
and the parent have an interest in avoiding an erroneous
termination, severing the ties between the parent and child,
the child also has an interest in avoiding an erroneous
continuation of a relationship where abuse is present.216 Thus,
since the interests of the parent and the child are of equal
importance, the appropriate conclusion, according to Justice
Rehnquist, is to apportion the risk of an erroneous termination
equally and therefore the preponderance of the evidence
standard is the correct standard.217
Based on the foregoing, it is apparent that children are
not afforded the same protection as adults in termination
proceedings. While it is undeniable that parents have a
fundamental right to the upbringing of their children, and that
the state has a compelling interest in avoiding wrongful
termination of parental custodial rights,218 children have an
equally compelling interest in remaining free from abuse.
However, as DeShaney demonstrates, children have no due
process protection to be free from abuse.219 Thus, while parents
have the Fourteenth Amendment right to the control of their
children and the added protection of the clear and convincing
standard in termination proceedings, children have virtually no
protection.220 As such, the clear and convincing standard may
not always be the right standard to apply in termination
proceedings. In order to best protect a child’s interest to be free
from abuse, it is prudent to lower the standard of proof from
clear and convincing to a preponderance of the evidence in
some circumstances, such as cases involving extreme and
potentially dangerous religious communities.
In the case of the children from the Yearning for Zion
Ranch, the children remain at risk of abuse due to the
“pervasive belief system” of the community,221 as evidenced by
the presence of pregnant and “married” underage females on
215

Id. at 788 n.13.
Id.
217
Id. at 791; see generally Raymond C. O’Brien, An Analysis of Realistic Due
Process Rights of Children Versus Parents, 26 CONN. L. REV. 1209 (1994) (arguing that
the clear and convincing standard is too onerous a burden and does not adequately
protect the interests of the children involved).
218
See supra text accompanying notes 33-36.
219
See supra notes 211-212 and accompanying text.
220
See supra notes 211-212 and accompanying text.
221
In re Steed, No. 03-08-00235-CV, 2008 WL 2132014, at *2 (Tex. App. May
22, 2008), aff’d sub nom. In re Tex. Dep’t of Family and Protective Servs., 255 S.W.3d
613 (Tex. 2008).
216
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the Ranch.222 Although the Texas Supreme Court held that
there was not enough evidence of an imminent threat to the
children’s health or welfare,223 given this risk of future abuse,
the children on the Ranch should be removed. Yet, in order to
establish abuse warranting removal, the standard of proof
must be lowered. If it can be established by clear and
convincing evidence that some of the children in a family-like
community were abused, then the standard by which the state
needs to show that the other children are threatened by abuse
should be lowered to a preponderance of the evidence standard.
Therefore, since there was enough evidence of abuse to satisfy
the clear and convincing standard for five pregnant and
married underage girls on the Ranch,224 then it should be
possible to prove abuse as to the other children by a
preponderance of the evidence.225
While it is true that the boys living on the Ranch are not
subject to the same possibility of abuse as the girls, they should
nevertheless be considered in danger.226 Regardless of gender, if
one child is abused in the home by the parents then the other
children are deemed to be at risk and the parents are
considered unfit.227 Because there is abuse against some of the
girls at the Ranch, which can be analogized to a family,228 the
boys should be removed from the Ranch as well. A study in the
Netherlands concluded that there are actually few differences
between sexual abuse towards girls and boys and in as many as
21% of the cases studied, offenders were equally interested in
males and females.229 Additionally, parental termination
222

See In re Tex. Dep’t of Family and Protective Servs., 255 S.W.3d at 616
(O’Neill, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part).
223
Id. at 615 (majority opinion).
224
See In re Steed, 2008 WL 2132014, at *2 (noting that there was no evidence
as to abuse in the children except as to the five female children).
225
By lowering the standard to a preponderance of the evidence for the
remaining children not showing signs of abuse, the state will be able to prove the need
for termination by demonstrating conclusive abuse in some of the children on the
Ranch and the presence of pervasive belief condoning abuse. This is based on the
presumption that where abuse is present in some children, it is likely to be present or
at least pose a risk to other children in the same environment. See supra Part II.B.
226
Courts have been willing to find a risk of potential abuse where one child
has been abused regardless of the gender of the child’s siblings. See, e.g., In re
Burchfield, 555 N.E.2d 325, 333 (Ohio Ct. App. 1988) (removing both the brother and
sister of a female child who had suffered sexual abuse based on the unfitness of the
environment).
227
See supra note 165 and accompanying text.
228
See supra Part II.B.
229
Farber et al., supra note 168, at 295.
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statutes, such as the Texas Family Code, do not differentiate
by gender when authorizing removal of one child because of
evidence of sexual abuse to the child’s sibling.230 In fact, the
California Appellate Court has specifically dealt with the issue
of abuse towards a female child as being sufficient evidence for
removal of her brothers.231 The court held that “[b]rothers can
be harmed by the knowledge that a parent has so abused the
trust of their sister”232 and “aberrant sexual behavior by a
parent places the victim’s siblings who remain in the home at
risk of aberrant sexual behavior.”233 Furthermore, boys exposed
to a sister’s abuse are being taught to become predators.
Although there was no evidence that the boys on the Ranch
were subject to sexual abuse, there is still a strong argument to
be made that they are residing in a dangerous atmosphere.
Therefore, a preponderance of evidence of abuse could be
demonstrated to effectuate removal.
IV.

POTENTIAL ISSUES ARISING FROM LOWERING THE
STANDARD OF PROOF

Analogizing the Yearning for Zion Ranch to a family to
provide a legal basis for lowering the standard of proof required
to terminate parental rights is not without potential criticisms.
Although these criticisms are valid, they do not create
impermeable barriers to lowering the standard of proof under
specific circumstances.
A.

Unequal Application of Due Process Principles

The first potential issue arises from the premise of the
argument: that in some cases the standard of proof required to
230

TEX. FAM. CODE ANN. § 262.201(d)(1)-(2) (2008). The statute specifically
states: “In determining whether there is a continuing danger to the physical health or
safety of the child, the court may consider whether the household to which the child
would be returned includes a person who: . . . has sexually abused another child.”
§ 262.201(d)(2) (2005). Similarly, in New York, “proof of abuse or neglect of one child
shall be admissible evidence of the abuse or neglect of any other child.” N.Y. FAM. CT.
ACT § 1046 (1999). California’s statute provides that a child may be deemed a
dependent of the court if “[t]he child has been sexually abused, or there is a substantial
risk that the child will be sexually abused . . . by his or her parent” or if “[t]he child’s
sibling has been abused or neglected” in a manner defined by this section. CAL. WELF.
& INT. CODE § 300(d), (j) (West 2008).
231
In re P.A., 51 Cal. Rptr. 3d 448, 452-54 (Cal. Ct. App. 2006).
232
Id. at 453 (citing In re Rubisela E., 101 Cal. Rptr. 2d 760, 775 (Cal.Ct. App.
2000)).
233
Id. at 454.
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terminate parental rights should be lowered. This creates an
inequality in the application of parental termination law, where
parents who are not part of a religious family espousing beliefs
in child abuse are afforded a higher burden of proof than their
counterparts who are part of such religious groups. Thus, certain
persons are arguably provided greater due process than others.
While on its face this criticism may ring true, the reality
is that parents will still be afforded substantial due process
even in situations where the standard of proof should be
lowered. Due process requires procedural and substantive
safeguards to protect parents from an erroneous termination
decision.234 By lowering the burden of proof, there is no change
substantively because the government still needs to prove a
compelling interest in order to terminate the parent’s rights.235
Procedurally, parents will be afforded protections because they
will still be allowed a hearing before the termination of their
rights and further, it will be necessary to first prove by clear
and convincing evidence that at least one child is suffering
from child abuse as a result of a pervasive belief system within
the religious family. Thus, the burden of proof will be lowered
only after the state had produced clear and convincing evidence
of some abuse. Consequently, the lower standard of proof will
only apply to other children after the higher standard has
already been met.
Furthermore, applying the preponderance of the
evidence standard to parental termination proceedings will still
comport with the Eldridge factors. In fact, each of the Eldridge
factors will probably be applied more equitably.236 First, the
private interest affected by lowering the burden of proof in
certain cases considers both the child and the parent as distinct
interests. Whereas currently the parent’s interest also include
the child’s interest because it is assumed that their interests
align,237 by lowering the burden of proof, the child is given a
distinct interest from the parent to be free from abuse. This
distinction of interests is apposite because the child’s interest
was presumed aligned with the parent’s interest up until the
point in time where clear and convincing evidence of abuse was
shown as to another child. Once this threshold has been
passed, it should then be assumed that the child’s interest
234
235
236
237

See supra Part IA.1.
See supra Part IA.1.
See supra notes 32-43.
Ross, supra note 205, at 366-67.
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diverges from the parent’s. Second, the government’s interest is
enhanced in the sense that its interest in ensuring the health,
safety, and welfare of the children involved will be given
greater consideration.238 By seriously considering the threat of
abuse in a community where a pervasive belief system
condoning abuse exists, the government’s interest in the
children’s welfare is given greater weight than if the sole
standard is the clear and convincing standard. Further,
lowering the standard of proof in certain cases will also
inherently lessen fiscal and administrative burdens in that it
will not be necessary to exhaust resources attempting to collect
elusive physical evidence for children who are in danger as a
result of a belief condoning abuse and evidence of abuse in
other children besides themselves.239
Finally, the risk of an erroneous decision resulting in a
parent’s rights being terminated unjustly is no more than
where a parent’s rights are terminated as to one child when
there is no abuse as to that child but there is clear and
convincing evidence of abuse committed against another child
in the same family.240 If terminating a parent’s rights to all of
his or her children as a result of abuse of one child complies
with due process,241 then applying the same principles to the
Ranch, being treated as a family, should likewise comply with
due process. Consequently, even if the standard of proof is
lowered in some specific cases, the parents involved in these
cases will still be afforded an appropriate level of due process.
Even if it is conceded that some parents will be afforded
a different level of due process than other parents, equality in
due process is not necessary and not always possible. This
should not be viewed as lowering the standard of proof because,
as noted by the Supreme Court in Lassiter v. Department of
Social Services of Durham County, North Carolina, “due
process ‘is not a technical conception with a fixed content
unrelated to time, place and circumstances.’”242 The Court went
on to hold that the “fundamental fairness” required by due
process may vary based on the circumstances and thus a case-
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by-case analysis is appropriate.243 Dissenting from the majority
in the Santosky opinion, Justice Rehnquist reasoned that “‘not
all situations calling for procedural safeguards call for the
same kind of procedure.’”244 In his opinion, Justice Rehnquist
stated that the flexibility of the due process concept required
that its mandates be considered based upon the facts of each
particular case.245 Thus, considering due process requirements
on a case-by-case basis means that it is not necessary in every
case to afford the same standard of proof afforded in a previous
case of the same nature because the underlying facts will
inherently require a different analysis.
Accordingly, while it is possible to argue that lowering
the standard for termination of parental rights will afford
unequal constitutional process to some people based upon
certain criteria, this is not fatal to this Note’s argument. First,
a different standard of due process does not necessarily mean
that the parents are not being afforded the appropriate level of
due process. Second, the concept of due process is not
completely clear or concrete, and thus, it is essential to provide
for different procedural safeguards based upon the specific
facts of the case. Therefore, regardless of whether the state is
required to prove by only clear and convincing evidence or clear
and convincing and by a preponderance of the evidence, a
parent’s constitutional rights to due process will be protected.
B.

Problems with Treating the Ranch as a Family

A second criticism arising from lowering the standard of
proof in certain parental rights termination proceedings
evolves from the idea that the Yearning for Zion Ranch is
treated as a single family. First, treating the Ranch as a family
would be contrary to the concept that each parent must be
suspected of abuse before a child can be removed.246 Second,
defining the Ranch as a family would create a slippery slope to
243

Id. at 24-26.
See Santosky v. Kramer, 455 U.S. 745, 774-75 (1982) (Rehnquist, J.
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allow other communities to be considered a family for the
purpose of parental termination. While both of these
arguments raise legitimate concerns, ultimately they should
not defeat the objective that the burden of proof for parental
termination proceedings must be lowered in some instances.
The first counterargument to treating the Ranch as a
family unit arises from the concept that each parent needs to
be accused individually of abuse. The Texas courts specifically
rejected the argument by the Department that the Ranch
should be treated as one family unit.247 The Texas Court of
Appeals noted that among the FLDS communities there were
differences in opinions as to “what is an appropriate age to
[marry], how many spouses to have, and when to start having
children.”248 The court went on to state that “not all FLDS
families are polygamous or allow their female children to
marry as minors.”249 Supporting the view that the community’s
beliefs cannot be treated as one whole, Catherine Ross in her
article, Legal Constraints on Child-Saving: The Strange Case of
the Fundamentalist Latter-Day Saints at Yearning for Zion
Ranch, argues that the Fourth Amendment requires that
“individualized suspicion of each parent [is necessary] before
his or her child is removed.”250
While these arguments against treating the Ranch as a
family are somewhat compelling, they are not sufficient to
preclude lowering the burden of proof. In analyzing the
Department’s argument regarding treating the Ranch as a
family, the Texas Court of Appeals simply stated that the
notion that the Ranch constituted a family was contrary to the
evidence, not that such a concept was an unreasonable
possibility.251 Ostensibly, if sufficient evidence is presented, the
Ranch or a similar community could be considered a family.
Further, Professor Ross admits that requiring child welfare
workers to “weigh the risk of abuse to each child in the
household before removing the child” is a break from current
247
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practice.252 Therefore, because the current laws of most states
allow the government to remove children that it suspects are at
a risk of abuse based on evidence of abuse to siblings, requiring
individualized proof that each child is at risk from each parent
is too stringent of a standard.
Even if individualized proof is too stringent of a
standard, critics may still argue that analogizing the Ranch to
a family creates precedent that all religious communities or
communities organized in a manner espousing a particular
belief can also be analogized to a family. This parallel to a
family should not be read so broadly. The Ranch can be
analogized to a family because of the extreme measures it has
taken to seclude itself from the rest of society and the lifestyle
the members of the Ranch lead, including polygamy (creating
confusion as to who comprises each nuclear family) and an
integrated system of working and living together.253 Thus,
asserting that the Ranch constitutes a legal family for the
purpose of a parental termination proceeding is much different
from a religious community that may share a belief system,
attend religious services together, share meals together, etc.,
but are still members of the rest of society because they live
and work and integrate with people outside of their
community. Therefore, while it is possible that other
communities could be seen as families for the sake of parental
termination proceedings if the Ranch is considered a family,
such a determination should be limited to situations where the
community truly resembles a family as defined by cases such
as Penobscot Area Housing Development Corp. and Borough of
Glassboro.254
V.

CONCLUSION

Parents have a constitutional right to the custody and
control of their children, which encompasses the control over the
religious upbringing of their children.255 Because this right is
deemed to be fundamental, clear and convincing evidence of abuse
and neglect must be demonstrated when the state seeks to
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terminate these parental rights.256 However, while this standard
adequately protects the rights of the parents, it fails to adequately
protect the rights of the children to be free from abuse or neglect.
In parental termination cases in a closed community where
there is a pervasive belief system condoning sexual abuse of
children, similar to that of the Yearning for Zion Ranch, the best
procedure is to require clear and convincing evidence that abuse
has occurred in some of the children as a result of this belief
system. However, since this type of community resembles a family,
it should be treated as a legal family. Thus, abuse found in one
child in the community should be enough to remove the other
children. In order to protect the interest of the children to be free
from abuse, while still protecting the constitutional rights of
parents to the custody of their children, the standard of proof
required to remove the children who have not been abused should
be the preponderance of the evidence standard. Therefore, to
satisfy the burden of proof for parental termination, the state needs
only prove that the children who have not been abused more likely
than not will be abused because of the clear and convincing
evidence of the actual abuse of other children in the compound.
By lowering the standard of proof required for termination
of parental custody rights, the court will be protecting the rights of
children to live free from the abuse of their parents. Although the
First Amendment right of free exercise of religion and the
Fourteenth Amendment parental due process right require
preservation, their importance should not overshadow the need for
the state to protect the welfare of children.257
Brittany Nilson†
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